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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Respondent disputes Petitioner's statement that this Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) because Petitioner is not seeking review of a final 
order resulting from formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency. However, 
Respondent acknowledges that U.C.A. § 10-3-1106(6)(a) appears to confer jurisdiction 
upon this Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondent does not take issue with Petitioner's framing of his First, Third, or 
Sixth Issue on appeal and, therefore, those issues are not restated herein. However, with 
regard to the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Issues included in the Brief of Petitioner 
("Petitioner's Brief), Respondent respectfully submits that those issues misrepresent the 
findings of the Midvale Appeals Board. 1 Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the 
Petitioner's Second Issue gives the impression that the Appeals Board found that 
Petitioner was guilty of theft. However, the Appeals Board indicated that taking, 
copying and distributing the photos in question to other "may" be an act of theft 
and misappropriation of property of another. Finding of Fact #10. However, the 
Appeals Board then clarified that, whether or not such action rose to the level of 
theft, "an employee does not have the right to copy files from the city's computer 
and possess them." Finding of Fact #11. 
As framed by Petitioner, the Fourth and Fifth Issue each indicate that the reports to 
the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and 
Firearms were included as an element of Mr. Guenon's termination when, in fact, 
the Appeals Board specifically found that they were not: "Appellant was not 
disciplined because he reported suspected crimes to the Utah Attorney General or 
suspected violations to the ATF but was disciplined for his failure to report these 
suspected violations of rules and law to his supervisors and through the 
appropriate chain of command." Finding of Fact #26. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Respondent sets forth alternate issues that it believes 
more accurately reflects the decision from which Petitioner appeals: 
Second Issue: Did substantial evidence support the Appeals Board's finding 
that Petitioner improperly copied and possessed files from a City computer? 
Standard of Review: Question of fact. "When reviewing the factual findings 
made by an administrative agency, an appellate court will generally reverse only if the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Utah, 939 P.2d 177,181 (Utah 1997). 
Fourth Issue: Did the Appeals Board correctly determine that Petitioner 
violated the appropriate chain of command when he failed to report his concerns 
regarding photos of Midvale City employees to his superiors? 
Standard of Review: Question of fact. "When reviewing the factual findings 
made by an administrative agency, an appellate court will generally reverse only if the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Utah, 939 P.2d 177,181 (Utah 1997). 
Fifth Issue: Did the Appeals Board correctly determine that Petitioner violated 
the appropriate chain of command when he failed to report his concerns regarding the 
storage of explosives to his superiors? 
Standard of Review: Question of fact. "When reviewing the factual findings 
made by an administrative agency, an appellate court will generally reverse only if the 
2 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT ISSUE 
Respondent does not refer to any constitutional provisions, statutes or ordinances 
not already listed in Petitioner's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
After being placed on administrative leave pending an investigation into his 
official conduct, Petitioner was terminated from his position as a police officer of 
Midvale City on October 28,2008. Prior to the decision to terminate Petitioner, after due 
notice, the Midvale City Police Chief conducted a pre-disciplinary hearing that was 
attended by Petitioner and his legal counsel. Subsequently, Petitioner was provided with 
a written Disciplinary Order which enumerated the reasons for his termination, namely 
several separate violations of Midvale City policy and Midvale Police Department 
policies and procedures. Petitioner appealed his termination to the Midvale City 
Employee Appeals Board ("Appeals Board"). After a hearing held over the course of 
two days, hearing testimony of witnesses and accepting exhibits into the record, the 
Appeals Board affirmed Petitioner's termination. 
Response to Petitioner's Statement of Facts 
Petitioner's statement of facts is noticeably void of any facts supporting the 
Appeals Board's decision. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed in his burden to marshal the 
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facts that support the Appeals Board's decision, and then demonstrate how such facts did 
not constitute sufficient evidence to meet the "substantial evidence" standard. See 
Mallinckrodt v. Salt Lake County, 983 P.2d 566 (Utah 1999) (To prove that a decision is 
not supported by substantial evidence, the appealing party has the obligation to marshal 
all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts and 
in light of the conflicting evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence).2 
Respondent respectfully submits that, in light of Petitioner's failure to meet its 
marshaling burden, this Court should hold that the findings of fact supporting Midvale 
City's decision should not be disturbed. Showalter Motor Co. v. Dep't of Workforce 
Servs, 2004 UT App 220 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
Respondent's Statement of Facts 
1. Petitioner was employed as a police office with the City of Midvale 
beginning May 5,2003. R. at 53—transcript p. 139:13-15. 
2. In or about July, 2008, Midvale City was informed that Petitioner had taken 
possession of photographs of other employees of the Midvale Police Department and had 
delivered copies of those photographs to the Utah Attorney General because he alleged 
they contained evidence of criminal activity, without having also informed his 
supervisors of his concerns regarding the photographs. R. at 4-5. 
2
 Petitioner's failure to marshal the facts is more fully discussed in Section II herein. 
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3. After some preliminary investigation which raised concerns that 
Petitioner's possession of those photographs had resulted from improper means, on July 
30, 2008, Petitioner was placed on administrative leave pending investigation of his 
conduct as a police officer with Midvale City (the "City"). R. at 219. 
4. The evidence showed that Petitioner had either copied the photographs 
from a City computer or had taken a disk that belonged to another City employee (not 
City property), which disk contained the photographs. R. at 69-71. 
5. In either case, Petitioner admitted that the photographs were not his, but 
that he took them and stored them in his personal residence. R. at 70—transcript p. 
206:15-207:8. 
6. Although Petitioner later claimed that he did not look at the photographs 
when he copied them (and thus was allegedly unaware of their content), he admitted to 
the Midvale City administrator, Kane Loader, that he had, in fact, reviewed the 
photographs when he downloaded them. R. at 141. 
7. Petitioner wrote "job security" on the disk containing the photos and took 
the disk to his personal residence. R. at 6—transcript p. 17-20; R. at 70—transcript p. 
209:12-16. 
8. Petitioner also admitted that his purpose in downloading the photographs 
was to give "shit" to the individuals portrayed in the photographs. R. at 141; R. at 70— 
transcript p. 208:1-8. 
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9. Petitioner had possession of the photographs for at least six months, and as 
long as a year (R. at 141; R. at 70—transcript p. 206; R. at 180). 
10. In spite of possessing the photographs for such a significant period of time, 
Petitioner failed to make any report to his superiors regarding his alleged concerns about 
the content of the photographs. 
11. In addition, when Petitioner finally did raise his alleged concerns with the 
photographs by reporting them to the Utah Attorney General's office in July 2008, it was 
after his relationship with certain of the individuals in the photographs had soured. R. at 
181 (indicating that Petitioner had filed an unrelated complaint against certain individuals 
in the photographs in June 2008). 
12. While Petitioner was on administrative leave, the City became aware of 
other violations of City and Midvale Police Department policies, including the existence 
of pornographic material on Petitioner's computer (R. at 6-7—transcript p. 24:20-25:14), 
and Petitioner's failure to properly handle evidence (R. at 5—transcript p. 18:10-20:14). 
13. The City conducted an inventory of Petitioner's vehicle upon placing 
Petitioner on administrative leave. R. at 5—transcript p. 18:10-14. 
14. That inventory disclosed forty-four identification cards, including social 
security cards and a credit card of varying individuals, some of whom were potential 
suspects and/or victims of criminal activities. Id. 
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15. Midvale Police Department General Order 13-1 provides that property shall 
be placed in evidence before the end of an officer's shift and that evidence and property 
should not be stored in an officer's car, desk, locker, or office. R. at 265. 
16. The volume of items found in Petitioner's vehicle demonstrated that 
Petitioner had been accumulating these evidentiary and property items over a long period 
of time. R. at 5; transcript p. 20:11-14. 
17. The City also had Petitioner's computer reviewed to determine whether it 
contained anything in violation of City and Midvale Police Department policy. R. at 6— 
transcript p. 24:20-24. 
18. The results of the forensic examination of Petitioner's computer revealed 
the existence of pornographic material. R. at 6; transcript p. 24:24-25:14. 
19. Midvale City policy states that "the use of city (police) owned computer 
resources to intentionally view, download, or send pornography, sexually explicit 
materials or materials with sexual content is prohibited." R. at 271. 
20. Although Petitioner claimed that any pornographic material was sent to him 
without his consent and that he therefore did not intentionally view the material, the 
evidence showed that at least three of the pornographic video files (one of a man and 
woman having sex, and two of individuals performing oral sex) had been opened and 
viewed again after the files were originally downloaded to Petitioner's computer, as 
recently as July 27,2008. R. at 27; transcript pp. 107:17-108:10. 
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21. The evidence also showed that Petitioner was in possession of his computer 
at the times that the pornographic files were downloaded to his computer, as well as at 
the time such files were accessed and viewed again. R. at 27-28—transcript pp. 108-111. 
22. At some point after Petitioner was placed on administrative leave, the City 
also became aware that Petitioner had previously made a report to the Bureau of Alcohol 
Tobacco and Firearms regarding the storage of explosives at the Midvale City Police 
Department and that he had failed to report his concerns to his superiors. R. at 246-249. 
23. Once the City was notified by ATF of the storage requirements for the 
explosives, appropriate measures were taken immediately. R. at 8—transcript pp. 29:21-
30:7. 
24. Due to the Chief's determination that the totality of Petitioner's policy 
violations (i.e., mishandling of evidence, possession of the property of another, failure to 
inform his supervisors of alleged criminal activities and safety violations, and the 
existence and apparent willful viewing of unauthorized pornographic material on his 
computer), had resulted in a situation in which the Chief had lost all trust and confidence 
in Petitioner as an officer, the City terminated Petitioner effective October 29, 2008. R. 
at 8—transcript p. 32:10-16. 
25. The bases for Petitioner's termination were provided in the Disciplinary 
Order dated October 28,2008. R. at 222-224. 
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26. Petitioner appealed his termination to the Midvale City Employee Appeals 
Board ("Appeals Board"). 
27. A hearing before the Appeals Board was held on November 20, 2008 and 
December 1,2008. 
28. On December 10, 2008, the Appeals Board upheld the termination of 
Petitioner as the result of his violation of City and Policy Department policies and 
procedures. Findings of Fact and Conclusions dated December 10,2008.3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The party challenging the findings of the. Appeals Board has the duty to marshal 
the evidence supporting those findings and to then demonstrate how the evidence did not 
constitute sufficient evidence to meet the "substantial evidence" standard of review. 
Petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the findings of the Appeals Board should not be 
disturbed. 
Even if this Court addresses Petitioner's challenges to the findings of the Appeals 
Board, in spite of Petitioner's failure to marshal the evidence, substantial evidence 
existed in the record to support the findings of the Appeals Board that (1) Petitioner 
mishandled evidence in violation of clear Midvale Police Department policy; (2) 
Petitioner improperly took possession of property that did not belong to him; (3) 
3
 Respondent acknowledges that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions do not 
appear to be part of the record. However, as that decision is what forms the basis 
for Petitioner's appeal, Respondent agrees that it must be considered herein. 
Furthermore, the copy attached as Addendum B to Petitioner's Brief appears to be 
a true and correct copy of such document. 
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Petitioner intentionally viewed pornographic material on his computer, in violation of 
clear Midvale Policy Department policy; and (4) Petitioner knowingly and intentionally 
disregarded his obligation to make reports of alleged criminal activity and safety 
violations to his superiors and did not comply with the proper chain of command for 
doing so. Petitioner was not terminated as a result of his reports to the Utah Attorney 
General's office or the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms. Furthermore, 
Petitioner's reports to those agencies were not made in good faith. As a result, even if 
Petitioner's termination was related to such reports, Petitioner is not entitled to the 
protections of the Utah Protection of Employees Act. 
Finally, considerable deference is given to a police chiefs choice of punishment 
because he is in a position to balance the competing concerns in pursuing a particular 
disciplinary action. When a disciplined officer asserts that he received disparate 
treatment, that officer is required to present a prima facie case showing that the chief's 
actions were contrary to his prior practice, which Petitioner has failed to do. Petitioner 
has simply not met his burden of demonstrating that the discipline imposed upon him was 
disproportionate or unwarranted in relation to the totality of the violations of policy he 
committed. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the findings of the Appeals Board and 
its conclusion that Petitioner's termination was an appropriate discipline. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As the party challenging the Appeal Board's decision, Petitioner bears the burden 
of demonstrating either (1) that the facts do not support the charges made by the Chief or 
(2) that the charges do not warrant the sanction imposed4 Greer v. Salt Lake City Civil 
Serv. Comm., 2007 UT App 293 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). When reviewing a disciplinary 
action involving a police officer, this Court is mindful that "[discipline imposed for 
employee misconduct is within the sound discretion of the Chief. The Chief must have 
the ability to manage and direct his officers, and is in the best position to know whether 
their actions merit discipline." Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm., 8 P.3d 1048, 
1055 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
Further, with regard to the first prong of Petitioner's burden, an appellate court 
will generally reverse factual findings only if the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 
1997). "Substantial evidence" is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is 
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. First Nafl Bank of 
Boston v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 
1990). This Court does not "substitute its judgment as between two reasonably 
4
 Respondent acknowledges that this appeal is taken from a city employee appeals 
board rather than the Civil Service Commission. Nevertheless, Respondent 
concurs with Petitioner that the standards and guidelines established for actions 
before the Civil Service Commission (and appeals therefrom) are applicable here. 
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conflicting views, even though [it] may have come to a different conclusion had the case 
come before [it] for de novo review." EAGALA, Inc. v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 157 
P.3d 334, 338 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). It is the province of the Appeals Board to resolve 
conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same 
evidence, it is for the Appeals Board to draw the inferences. Id. 
Finally, while Petitioner seeks a finding that the discipline imposed by the City is 
inconsistent with treatment of other officers, this Court is only required to consider the 
consistency of treatment of other officers after a "prima facie showing by [Petitioner] that 
the Chief's actions in [Petitioner's] case were contrary to his prior practice." Kelly, 8 
P.3d 1048 at 1055. Petitioner has failed to meet these burdens and the decision of the 
Appeals Board should be affirmed. 
II. PETITIONER FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
Petitioner has failed in its burden of marshaling the facts in the record that support 
the City of Midvale's decision, and then demonstrating how such facts did not constitute 
sufficient evidence to meet the "substantial evidence" standard. See Mallinckrodt v. Salt 
Lake County, 983 P.2d 566 (Utah 1999) (To prove that a decision is not supported by 
substantial evidence, the appealing party has the obligation to marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts and in light of the 
conflicting evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence). 
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Petitioner is not allowed to just marshal some of the evidence, but is required to 
"present 'every scrap of competent evidence . . . which supports the very findings the 
appellants resists' and then 'ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence.'" T.H. v. /?.C. (In re 
E.H.), 2006 UT 36, 5 64, 137 P.3d 809 (Utah 2006). Petitioner is then required to 
describe how the evidence presented related to and supported the City's conclusion: 
To appropriately marshal evidence, parties must 'provide a precisely 
focused summary of all of the evidence supporting the findings they 
challenge. This summary must correlate all particular items of evidence 
with the challenged findings and then convince us that the [deciding body] 
erred in the assessment of that evidence to its findings.' Indeed, parties 
challenging factual findings must 'fully embrace the adversary's position' 
and play 'devil's advocate.' 
Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22,5 30, 112 P.3d 495 (Utah 2005). 
Petitioner lists six issues for review in his Brief of Petitioner, four of which he 
acknowledges request a review of factual findings made by the Mid vale City Employee 
Appeals Board, with a standard of review that indicates an appellate court will not 
reverse those factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
See Brief of Petitioner, Issues for Review #1, 2, 3, and 6. Yet, in spite of this 
acknowledgement, Petitioner makes no attempt whatsoever to marshal the evidence that 
supported the City's factual findings, instead engaging in a recitation of only those facts 
that support Petitioner's argument that the City erred in making its findings. This is 
insufficient to meet Petitioner's marshaling burden-in light of Petitioner's failure to any 
attempt to marshal the facts, this Court should hold that the findings of fact supporting 
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Midvale City's decision should not be disturbed. Showalter Motor Co. v. Dep't of 
Workforce Servs, 2004 UT App 220 (Utah Ct. App. 2004); Whitear v. Labor 
Commission, 973 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[petitioner merely states those 
facts most favorable to his position and ignores the contrary evidence. This is not 
adequate. When a party fails to marshal the evidence, we assume the record supports the 
Commission's findings.") (internal citations omitted). 
III. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE APPEALS BOARD'S 
FINDING THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED POLICE DEPARTMENT 
POLICY IN HANDLING EVIDENCE 
Even if this Court chooses to address Petitioner's challenges to the Appeals 
Boards' factual determinations in spite of his marshaling failure, the record contains 
substantial evidence that Petitioner violated police department policy in handling 
evidence. 
A. Midvale Police Department Policy Requires Property to be Placed in 
Evidence Before the End of an Officer's Shift and Prohibits the Storage of Evidence and 
Property in an Officer's Car. 
Midvale Police Department General Order Number 13-1 contains the following 
procedures with regard to Evidence and Property Procedures: 
1. Property shall be placed in evidence before the end of an officer's shift. 
2. Evidence and property should not be stored in an officer's car, desk, locker, 
or office. 
R. at 265. 
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Upon placing Petitioner on administrative leave, the City performed an inventory 
of the items in Petitioner's vehicle. R. at 5—transcript p. 18:10-14. That inventory 
produced forty-four identification cards, including social security cards and a credit card. 
Id. Furthermore, upon review, at least fourteen of the items discovered in Petitioner's 
vehicle were associated with reported cases within the department. R. at 20: transcript p. 
77:24-78:2; R. at 280-290. Another item was a stolen credit card that Midvale City was 
successful in returning to its owner after finding it in Petitioner's vehicle. R. at 19— 
transcript p. 75:8-77:1. 
B. The Sheer Number of Items of Identification Demonstrated the Severity of 
Petitioner's Violation of Policy. 
The volume of the items found in Petitioner's vehicle demonstrated that this was 
no small oversight and that Petitioner had been violating the policy regarding the 
handling of evidence over a long period of time. See R. at 5; transcript p. 20:11-14 
(Chief Mason testified that "what concerned me is that it was happening on an ongoing 
basis over a long period of time and it appears that these cards had been transferred from 
car to car as he was assigned to different cars."). 
Although Petitioner attempted to introduce evidence before the Appeals Board 
(and spends a significant amount of time in his brief discussing the testimony of other 
officers) that other officers did not comply with the policies regarding handling of 
evidence, Petitioner points to nothing in the record that remotely suggests that any officer 
had accumulated the volume of identification that was discovered in Petitioner's vehicle. 
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Furthermore, Petitioner simply cannot excuse his behavior by pointing to the similar 
behavior of others.5 See Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 116 P.3d 973, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005) ("We cannot agree that a violation of department regulations is justifiable merely 
because it is common and consensual among the participants; such considerations are 
relevant only in that they may affect the degree of discipline imposed."). Petitioner's 
violation of policy was significant and ongoing and properly formed a sufficient basis for 
Petitioner's discipline. 
IV. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE APPEALS BOARD'S 
FINDING THAT PETITIONER IMPROPERLY POSSESSED PROPERTY 
THAT DID NOT BELONG TO HIM 
The record contains substantial evidence to support the Appeals Board's finding 
that Petitioner improperly took possession of photographs that did not belong to him. 
A. Petitioner Misstates the Finding of the Appeals Board. 
Contrary to Petitioner's Second Issue set forth for this appeal, the Appeals Board 
did not discipline Petitioner for having committed theft or misappropriation. While it is 
true that the Appeals Board indicated that Petitioner's "taking, copying and distributing" 
private vacation photos of another officer "may" be an act of theft and misappropriation 
of property of another (Finding of Fact #10), the Appeals Board specifically found that, 
regardless of whether such actions rise to the level of theft, "an employee does not have 
the right to copy files from the city's computer and possess them." Finding of Fact #11. 
5
 In addition, as discussed in Section VILA, herein, Petitioner presents no evidence 
to suggest that Chief Mason knew of any other violations of this policy. 
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The Appeals Board also made findings with regard to Petitioner's intentions when 
making such copies, specifically noting that Petitioner had taken the photos with the 
intent of giving "shit" to the individuals depicted in them, Id., and had "admitted that he 
wrote on the DVD/CD "Job Security". Finding of Fact #12. 
The hearing before the Appeals Board was not a criminal trial. The City did not 
have a duty to prove Petitioner guilty of theft beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, it was 
proper for the Appeals Board to determine that Petitioner acted inappropriately by taking 
the photographs (whether by copying them from a City computer or by taking a disk that 
belonged to another employee). See Baird v. Cutler, 883 F. Supp. 591, 601 (D. Utah 
1995) ("a public employer is not required to follow 'procedures that substantially mirror 
the evidentiary rules used in court.' Rather, public employers may 'rely on hearsay, on 
past similar conduct, on their personal knowledge of people's credibility, and on other 
factors that the judicial process ignores.'"). 
B. The Appeals Board Found that Petitioner Did Not Have the Right to Copy 
and Possess the Photographs in Question. 
While Petitioner attempts to muddy the waters by claiming that it is unclear to 
whom the photographs actually belonged (i.e., whether they remained the property of the 
individual who originally viewed them on the laptop that Petitioner was later assigned, or 
whether they became City property once that individual relinquished the computer 
without having deleted them), there is no real dispute as to whether the photographs 
belonged to Petitioner. He admits they did not. Accordingly, the Appeals Board 
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properly found that Petitioner acted inappropriately when he then took those pictures to 
his personal residence and stored them there. 
V. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE APPEALS BOARD'S 
DETERMINATION THAT PETITIONER HAD INTENTIONALLY 
VIEWED PORNOGRAPHIC MATERIAL ON HIS CITY-OWNED 
COMPUTER 
Similarly, the record contains substantial evidence supporting the Appeals Board's 
finding that Petitioner intentionally viewed pornographic material on his computer. 
A. Midvale Policy Department Policy Prohibits the Intentional Viewing. 
Downloading, or Sending of Pornography, 
Midvale Police Department General Order Number 17-3 states as follows: 
"The use of city (police) owned computer resources to intentionally view, 
download, or send pornography, sexually explicit materials or materials with sexual 
content is prohibited." (emphasis added) R. at 211. 
In spite of this clear policy, however, several pornographic files were found on 
Petitioner's computer (people engaged in oral sex as well as an image of people having 
sex—R. at 27: transcript p. 107-108) when it was reviewed after Petitioner was placed on 
administrative leave. The existence of these files formed part of the basis for Petitioner's 
discipline. 
B. The Pornographic Materials Were Viewed Voluntarily. 
Petitioner argues that the City cannot discipline him because he claims he did not 
intentionally view pornographic materials on his City-issued computer. In making this 
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argument, Petitioner spends a great deal of time discussing how the files could have come 
to be downloaded onto his computer without his consent, and claiming that the small 
number of files on his computer should be taken as an indication that Petitioner did not 
intentionally view the pornographic files. Neither of these arguments defeats the 
substantial evidence that supports the finding that Petitioner violated the established 
policy. 
The City did (and does) in fact acknowledge that it is possible for someone to send 
a pornographic image or file to Petitioner without Petitioner's consent. However, even if 
the pornographic images were originally sent to Petitioner against his will, Petitioner 
never addresses the fact that pornographic files originally downloaded on October 18, 
2007 and January 29, 2008 were maintained on the computer and were in fact accessed 
again and viewed on more than one occasion, as late as July 27, 2008. R. at 27 — 
transcript p. 107:13-108:4-10.6 The testimony also established that the computer 
containing the pornographic materials was in Petitioner's possession at all times in 
question. R. at 27-28—transcript pp. 106:12-111:6. This completely uncontroverted 
testimony is more than sufficient to establish that Petitioner had intentionally viewed 
Craig Hall: "When were they last viewed?" Sgt. Hodgkinson: 'They were last 
viewed on July 27, 2008." Mr. Hall: "All three of them together or one or two or 
all three?" Sgt. Hodgkinson: "All three of them were viewed on that day." 
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prohibited pornographic material, regardless of how it may have gotten onto his computer 
in the first place.7 
VI. PETITIONER WAS NOT TERMINATED BECAUSE OF HIS REPORTS 
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ATF 
Although Petitioner repeatedly claims that he was terminated in violation of the 
Utah Protection of Employees Act, he does so in clear disregard of the actual decision 
that he is appealing. 
A. The Appeals Board Specifically Held that Petitioner Was Not Terminated 
Because of His Reports to The Utah Attorney General and ATF. 
While it is true that Petitioner's reports to the Utah Attorney General and ATF 
were discussed during the disciplinary process, it is not true that Petitioner was 
terminated as a result of making those reports. Petitioner claims to be appealing the 
decision of the Appeals Board, but fails to acknowledge that the Appeals Board 
specifically held: 
"That the Appellant was not disciplined because he reported suspected crimes to 
the Utah Attorney General or suspected violations to the ATF but was disciplined for his 
Petitioner's own statements also belie any claim that he wasn't the one who 
intentionally accessed the files on his laptop as recently as July 27, 2008. See R. 
at 259, a transcript of Petitioner's interview with Bob Shober conducted during the 
investigation while Petitioner was on administrative leave: Bob Shober: Okay. 
And What was in the that car? Your personal belongings?" Petitioner: "I had my 
personal belongings; um there was an AR 15 in there. Bob Shober: "Was your 
laptop in the ?' Petitioner: "No, I had my laptop, I gave that to them cause I take 
that out cause I don't like leaving sittin. [sic]" Bob Shober: "So, other officers 
don't have access to your laptop?' Petitioner: "Uh-uh." 
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failure to report these suspected violation of rules and law to his supervisors and through 
the appropriate chain of command." Finding of Fact #26. 
B. Petitioner Was Disciplined, In Part, for Not Reporting His Concerns to His 
Superiors. 
Petitioner's discipline was, at least in part, a result of failing to make appropriate 
reports about his concerns (in addition to his reports to outside agencies) through his 
chain of command. This distinction is critical. Midvale City is an agency tasked with 
enforcing the law. Yet, Petitioner did not feel it necessary or appropriate to notify his 
superiors of alleged criminal activity of its officers.8 Midvale also has a compelling need 
to ensure its officers adhere to their chain of command. "In an organization such as a 
police department, discipline and respect for the chain of command are critical to 
accomplishing order and public safety." Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2003), 
citing Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998). 'The need for 
adhering to a chain of command within a police department must not be minimized, for 
'the Chief's interest in running his department efficiently and in maintaining order and 
discipline among the ranks' is crucial in law enforcement." Malec v. Klatzco, 101 F. 
Supp. 2d 1066 (N.D. 111. 2000). In fact, because the adherence to the chain of command 
is so universally known and accepted in the context of a police department, numerous 
courts have held that officers who violate the chain of command are properly disciplined 
8
 It should be noted that both the Utah Attorney General's office and POST 
determined that the pictures did not warrant criminal or disciplinary action. R. at 
6—transcript p. 22; R. at 180-182. 
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(including termination) for doing so, even in light of considerations of First Amendment 
rights to free speech. See Mills v. City ofEvansville, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17092 (S.D. 
Ind. 2005) ("A police department 'is a paramilitary organization built on relationships of 
trust and loyalty, and as such the judgment of police officials regarding the disruptive 
nature of an officer's speech is entitled to considerable-although by no means complete-
deference."); Tyler v. City of Mountain Home, 72 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 1995) ("It has been 
recognized that a police department has a more significant interest than the typical 
government employer in regulating the speech activities in order 'to promote efficiency, 
foster loyalty and obedience to superior officers, maintain morale, and instill public 
confidence. Because police departments function as paramilitary organizations charged 
with maintaining public safety and order, they are given more latitude in their decisions 
regarding discipline and personnel regulations than an ordinary government employer."') 
(internal citations omitted); Davis v. City of Elk City, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 243 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (upholding discharge of officer for "going around the chain of command," 
bearing "in mind the heightened interest of a police department in maintaining discipline 
and harmony among employees."); Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 404 F.3d 504 (1st Cir. 
2005) (upholding termination for breaches of the police department's chain of command). 
Petitioner claims to have been concerned that a crime had been committed, 
evidenced by photographs in his possession, yet he failed to notify anyone within his 
department, whose very jobs are to investigate crime. Similarly, Petitioner claims to have 
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been concerned about the safety of his fellow officers and individuals in the surrounding 
area due the improper storage of explosives, yet he failed to bring those concerns to the 
attention of his superiors, who could have addressed the situation immediately, and 
instead allowed the alleged dangerous situation to remain unaddressed while awaiting 
ATF action. Petitioner knowingly and repeatedly chose to ignore his chain of command. 
This attitude toward a universal standard of behavior, considered crucial in paramilitary 
organizations such as Midvale City Police Department, rightfully formed part of the 
cumulative basis for Petitioner's termination. See Baird v. Cutler, 883 F. Supp 591 at 
606 ("Discipline for failure to abide by reasonable established procedures . . . even when 
it occurs in connection with 'whistleblowing,' does not constitute a violation of the 
"WhistleblowerAct"). 
C. The Utah Protection of Employees Act Only Applies to Individuals Who 
Make Reports in Good Faith. 
Furthermore, even if Petitioner's reports to ATF and the Utah Attorney General's 
office played any part in Petitioner's termination (which they did not), Petitioner is not 
protected by the Act because his reports were not made in good faith. In this regard, 
Petitioner errs by omission in his discussion of the protections he alleges he is afforded. 
Petitioner repeatedly refers to the protections afforded to individuals who reports "a 
violation of law, rule, or regulation." U.CA. § 67-21-3(l)(a). However, Petitioner 
studiously avoids discussing the requirement that the report must be made in good faith. 
The full text of the provision upon which Petitioner relies states as follows: 
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(1) (a) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee 
because the employee, or a person authorized to act on behalf of the 
employee, communicates in good faith the existence of any waste of public 
funds, property, or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a 
law, rule, or regulation adopted under the law of this state, a political 
subdivision of this state, or any recognized entity of the United States. 
(emphasis added). 
Although the Utah Protection of Employees Act (the "Act") doesn't define "good 
faith," other jurisdictions with a good faith requirement in their equivalent of a 
"whistleblower's" act, have held that in order to be afforded protection, it must be shown 
that the "whistleblowing was done in good faith on a concern regarding the wrongful 
activity reported rather than from a corrupt motive such as malice, spite, jealously or 
personal gain." Yonker v. Centers for Long Term Care of Gardner, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8251, *9 (D. Kan. 2006); Crandon v. State of Kansas, 897 P.2d 92 (Kan. 1995) 
(whistle-blowing claim requires that whistle-blowing was made in good faith and not for 
a corrupt or otherwise specious motive). Black's Law Dictionary recognizes that "good 
faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory 
definition," but concludes that "in common usage this term is ordinarily used to describe 
that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, 
generally speaking, means being faithful to one's duty or obligation." Black's Law 
Dictionary, Sixth Edition. 
A careful review of Petitioner's actions demonstrate that his actions were not 
taken in good faith. 
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• Petitioner possessed the photographs for more than six months before he became 
"concerned" about possible criminal violations. Finding of Fact #11. 
• Petitioner claimed that his purpose of making a copy of the pictures was to give 
"shit" to those individuals in the photos. R. at 71; transcript p. 210:17-18. 
• Petitioner claimed to not have viewed all of the photos when he copied them, yet 
managed to copy all of them onto a disk. Furthermore, Petitioner admitted to the 
City Administrator that he had indeed viewed the photos when he copied them, R. 
at 141. 
• Petitioner admitted that he wrote "job security" on the disk when he copied the 
pictures. Finding of Fact #12; R. at 6; transcript p. 17-20; R. at 70; transcript p. 
209:12-16. 
• Petitioner did not report the photographs to the Utah Attorney General until his 
relationship with individuals portrayed in the photographs had deteriorated. R. at 
141. 
• Petitioner claims that his reports to ATF were due to the concern for the safety of 
Midvale residents, yet even though the explosives were obtained in October 2007 
(R. at 183), Petitioner did not make a report to ATF until December 2007 (R. at 
186). 
• In addition, Petitioner's failure to report his concerns to his supervisors allowed 
the alleged dangerous condition to continue while Petitioner awaited action by 
ATF. 
Taken in context, it becomes abundantly clear that Petitioner did not make his 
reports out of a good faith concern over perceived criminal actions or safety violations. 
Instead, Petitioner intended all along to utilize the photographs to harass his co-workers, 
including his superior officers. He simply, eventually, decided that reporting them to the 
Attorney General's office was a good method for doing so. Accordingly, even if 
Petitioner's reports were the basis for his discipline, Petitioner is not entitled to protection 
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under the Utah Protection of Employees Act because his actions were not taken in good 
faith. 
VII. PETITIONER'S DISCIPLINE WAS NOT DISPROPORTIONATE 
Finally, in light of his numerous policy violations, Petitioner cannot demonstrate 
that the discipline imposed upon him "exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Greer v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Coram., 2007 UT App 293 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2007) (or, in other words, the second prong of Petitioner's burden—that of 
demonstrating that the charges do not warrant the sanction that was imposed). 
A. Petitioner Failed to Demonstrate that Other Similarly Situated Individuals 
Received Disparate Treatment. 
This Court is only required to consider the consistency of treatment of other 
officers after a "prima facie showing by [Petitioner] that the Chief's actions in 
[Petitioner's] case were contrary to his prior practice." Kelly, 8 P.3d 1048 at 1055. Here, 
although Petitioner argues that he should not have been disciplined for mishandling 
evidence because other officers did the same, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that 
Chief Mason was aware of this failure and treated those officers differently with respect 
to discipline. This is because the record clearly establishes that Chief Mason was not 
aware of any other officers failing to comply with department policy regarding evidence.9 
9
 See, for example, R. at 6: transcript p. 22:2-7 [Craig Hall: "Do you know if it's a 
common practice in the department that I.D.'s that have been taken or credit cards or 
whatever are just left hanging around the department?" Chief Mason: "I'm not aware of 
that and if, if there's other officers doing the same thing then they're in violation of the 
policy as well."]; R. at 9: transcript p. 36:11-14 [Ryan Hancey: Is that a policy you've 
enforced in the past?" Chief Mason: "I haven't been aware of any other violations in the 
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In addition, Petitioner fails to acknowledge that it was not a single, isolated 
incident of mishandling evidence that resulted in his disciplinary action, but rather an 
indication, based upon the volume and age of the items of identification, that Petitioner 
had been disregarding the policies with regarding to handling evidence and property for a 
significant period of time. See R. at 5: transcript p. 20:11-14 (Chief Mason: "What 
concerned me is that it was happening on an ongoing basis over a long period of time and 
it appears that these cards had been transferred from car to car as he was assigned 
different cars."). 
B. No One Individual Violation Resulted in Petitioner's Termination. 
Furthermore, Petitioner points to no other officer who was disciplined for a 
combination of (1) mishandling of evidence; (2) viewing unauthorized pornographic 
material on his City-owned computer; (3) improperly taking possession of the property of 
another; and (4) disregard of the chain of command. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot 
demonstrate that Chief Mason acted contrary to his prior practice. Meaningful disparate 
treatment can only be found when similar factual circumstances led to a different result 
without explanation. Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm., 8 P.3d 1048, 1055 
ast of it."; R. at 10: transcript p. 37:14-18 [Ryan Hancey: "Do you have any personal 
nowledge whether or not other officers within the department adhere to the evidence 
policy as you mentioned earlier?" Chief Mason: "I'm not aware of any other 
violations."]; R. at 10: transcript p. 38:12-20 [Ryan Hancey: "Are you aware of whether 
or not officers instead of booking identification cards put them in the shredder?" Chief 
Mason: "I'm not aware of that, no." Ryan Hancey: Are you aware of whether or not 
other officers in the department when they get identification cards leave them laying 
around in various rooms in the police station?" Chief Mason: "I'm not."]. 
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(Utah Ct. App. 2000). Here, Petitioner has simply failed to demonstrate that the Chief 
treated him differently than other similarly-situated officers. 
C. The Totality of the Circumstances Warranted the Discipline that was 
Imposed. 
In weighing the punishment against the offense, this Court should give deference 
to the Midvale Police Chiefs choice of punishment because, as the head of the police 
department, he is in a position to balance the competing concerns in pursuing a particular 
disciplinary action. Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 116 P.3d 973, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005). Given the degree of deference afforded to the chief's determination, this Court 
should reverse the chiefs choice of discipline as unduly excessive only when the 
punishment is "clearly disproportionate" to the offense. Id. 
While it certainly arguable that termination may not be warranted by just one of 
Petitioner's above-enumerated violations of department and/or city policy, the combined 
weight of the violations cast significant doubt over Petitioner's ability or willingness to 
abide by the rules and framework within which he was expected to work. Accordingly, 
Chief Mason concluded that termination was the necessary consequence: "I've got to be 
able to trust that these officers are treating the public the way the public should be 
treated, they are treating each other the way each other should be treated and that they are 
following chain of command and treating their superiors the way that they should be 
treated and I didn't feel like I could rely on that with him any longer." R. at 9: transcript 
p. 33:20-34:1. When determining whether Petitioner's discipline was proportional, it is 
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proper to look at the totality of the violations. See Greer v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. 
Comm., 2007 UT App 293 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). Chief Mason testified that, due to the 
totality of Petitioner's violations of department and city policies, he has "simply lost all 
trust and confidence in him as an officer." 
Termination was the proper, and proportionate, discipline in light of the number of 
violations of policy that had been substantiated. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Midvale City respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the decision of the Midvale City Employee Appeals Board, finding that the 
termination of Petitioner was supported by substantial evidence and that such discipline 
was proportional to the aggregate nature of Petitioner's actions and violations of both 
Midvale City and Midvale Police Department policy. 
Respectfully submitted this > f day of August, 2009 
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